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Abstract. This article argues that the new EU’s selective engagement with Islamist parties in its Southern neighbourhood following the Arab uprisings is the result of a partial shift in the EU’s frame used to understand political Islam, combined with a form of pragmatism that puts a premium on finding interlocutors in the region. Using the case studies of Tunisia and Egypt, it shows that the EU has replaced its previous monolithic conception of political Islam with an understanding that is more sensitive to differences among Islamists. This opens the door to some forms of engagement with those actors that renounce violence and demonstrate their commitment to work within the confines of democratic rules, while violent strands of political Islam and conservative groups remain at arm’s length. 









Before the Arab upheavals in 2011, the European Union (EU) was not pressed to deal with Islamist actors in its Southern neighbourhood as these were generally excluded from the official political scene in their home countries. Following the experience of Algeria in 1991, authoritarian secular governments were good at ostracising Islamist forces in domestic politics and at fostering the idea among western players that they were the only actors able to guarantee stability in the region (Behr, 2013; Haddadi, 2006). The only exception to this trend was the isolated case of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), with whom the EU had established political relations since the early 2000s as part of the enlargement process of which Turkey was part. In the rest of the Southern Mediterranean region, therefore, it was only with the Arab uprisings and the transition processes that followed that the political situation in some countries was significantly altered. Not only did the uprisings lead to the collapse of the old, authoritarian and mostly secular regimes, but they also featured the creation of Islamist-dominated parliamentary majorities and governments in such cases as Egypt and Tunisia, as well as a more prominent public presence of a variety of Islamist actors in the entire region. Following these changes, the EU’s approach also underwent a shift, moving from the previous policy of no-engagement with political Islam​[1]​ to some forms of engagement with some Islamist parties.
This article argues that these new forms of EU selective engagement with Islamist actors in its Southern neighbourhood after 2011 are the result of a partial shift in the EU’s framing of Islamists. From a relatively essentialist conception, which portrayed political Islam as a monolithic ontological threat, i.e., as a danger to EU secular and liberal identity, the EU shifted towards a more nuanced and contingencist understanding that differentiates among different types of Islamist actors. On the one hand, it has continued to neglect and even fight violent groups, and to look at conservative strands in sceptical terms because of their perceived ‘unfitness’ in terms of democratic and liberal credentials. On the other hand, it has started to engage with those actors that fulfil two criteria. First, they are perceived as moderate, i.e., they do not threaten the EU’s secular and liberal identity and values and have renounced violence. Second, they are in positions of power after being formally and legitimately elected. 
Thus, these changed perceptions of political Islam give new meaning to what can be defined as a pragmatic response of the EU to developments in the region. In need of having political interlocutors amidst the flurry of changes in the political elite makeup of the countries in the Southern Mediterranean, the engagement with Islamists is shaped by the frames that inform the EU’s understandings of political Islam. The pragmatism of the response is thus contingent on the EU’s perceptions and ways of understanding the situation on the ground. In turn, this approach reinforces the process of reframing of political Islam via interactions.
By showing how frames matter in shaping the enactment of EU policies towards political Islam, this article contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of processes of change and continuity in EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean. By concentrating on how ideational factors and their enactment shape the EU’s engagement with political Islam, it complements the existing literature that is predominantly focussed on investigating EU-Islamist relations as part of EU policies of democracy promotion and the impact that the inclusion/exclusion of Islamists can have on the same policies (e.g., Boubekeur, 2009; Pace, 2010).
Methodologically, the article is based on a qualitative analysis of documents by the European Parliament (EP) (e.g., resolutions, written questions, studies), the Commission (e.g., ENP progress reports, indicative programmes, statements), the European External Action Service (EEAS) (e.g., answers to questions, country-specific documents, statements) and the Council of the European Union (e.g., Council conclusions, answers to questions), and of statements and press releases of key EU foreign policy actors (e.g., Catherine Ashton, Federica Mogherini). This analysis is combined with a series of interviews the authors conducted with EU officials from the EP and the EEAS between 2014 and 2016. Moreover, the analysis is restricted to political parties and to the case studies of Tunisia and Egypt. First, the focus on parties is determined by the visibility of the EU’s engagement with these actors, who have been central in the transition processes at the political institutional level, a priority for both the countries in the region and the EU (Youngs, 2014). Unlike parties, contacts with Islamist civil society actors that are often taking place in less institutionalised settings and are more difficult to trace. Second, the cases of Tunisia and Egypt offer sufficient within- and across-country variation in the context of EU engagement with political Islam in its Southern neighbourhood after 2011. Not only do we observe an increasing role of Islamist actors on the political scene of both countries after the Arab uprisings, but Tunisia and Egypt also followed different domestic patterns in their transition processes, something that significantly influenced the behaviour and perception of the Islamist parties in the two countries by the EU. While falling beyond the scope of this contribution as Turkey is not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and did not experience any comparable uprisings, the case of EU-AKP relations is briefly considered insofar as it constitutes the most significant/only precedent of EU engagement with an Islamist political party in the Southern Mediterranean. 
The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss how the EU has framed political Islam before and after the Arab uprisings. We demonstrate that the EU’s view of Islamist actors as a threat to its ontological security remains unchanged, although there has been a more nuanced perception of what constitutes this threat since 2011. We then discuss how this partially revised frame has opened up the way to forms of selective engagement in both Tunisia and Egypt with actors that are conceived as moderate, while others have continued to be excluded. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in light of the overall framework of the special issue and suggest some directions for further research. 

Political Islam and EU ontological security: a partially new frame following the Arab uprisings
As discussed in the introduction to this special issue, the security-stability nexus has been the master frame informing, in different ways, all EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean. In the case of political Islam, security refers to ontological security, i.e. the security of the self. To realise a sense of agency, both individuals and states need to experience themselves ‘as a whole, continuous person in time’ (Mitzen, 2006: 342) and thus require cognitive stability, i.e., the certainty about what to expect and how to relate ends and means, to construct one’s identity and give security to the self. . This requires that the core elements of identity will not be threatened and presupposes a stable environment, especially in terms of relationships, given the relational nature of identity, generally formed in relation with, as well as opposition to, the ‘Other’. 
This also applies to the construction of the European identity. Following the Westphalian mode of differentiation, ‘the European collective identity has entailed the construction of its outside as inherently different and as a threat to its identity’ (Rumelili, 2004: 28), whereby the distinction between them and us is conducive to the establishment of a collective we (Neumann, 1999; Neumann & Welsh, 1991; Pace, 2002; Said 1991). For example, the Ottoman Empire represented the ‘Islamic’ Other of a Christian Europe first, and then, with the process of secularisation, the juxtaposition was defined in terms of culture and civilisation (Neumann & Welsh, 1991).   The EU has continued to build its identity on  secularism and liberalism (intended both politically as supportive of pluralism and civil and political liberties, and economically as promoter of market-friendly policies), as evident from its foundational treaties​[2]​ and its policies (cf. Introduction to this special issue; Wolff, this special issue). In terms of secular features, it is assumed that there is a positive relationship between secularisation and security, i.e. that the separation between religious principles and political activities (and hence the privatisation of religion) are positively associated with a stable and secure environment (Campbell, 1998; Mavelli, 2012). Similarly, EU policies have been informed by liberal values and principles both in terms of democracy promotion and economic policies (Kurki, 2011; Wetzel & Orbie, 2015). Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that political Islam tends to be perceived as the ‘Other’, through which not only is identity defined via processes of othering, but from which the EU also needs to be defended (cf., article by Wolff). Both the role that political Islam attributes to religion in the public sphere and some Islamist positions on a number of issues, such as women’s rights and religious minorities, are perceived as rather problematic from both a secular and liberal perspective (European Parliament 2012). 
The fact that the EU has regarded political Islam as a challenge to its ontological security has been strongly linked to an essentialist and monolithic understanding of this phenomenon (cf., Volpi, 2009; Pace & Wolff, 2017). The EU documents outlining the position and the policies implemented by Brussels towards the countries in the Southern Mediterranean, both in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and of the ENP (Association Agreements, Action Plans, Strategy Papers, etc.), point to the lack of appreciation of Islamist movements and parties in different countries. When mentioning political Islam, if at all, they broadly refer to ‘Islamist movements’ or ‘Islamist political parties’. 
Following from this essentialist understanding and the perceived threat of political Islam, no-engagement was thus the chosen policy by the EU. Interactions, when taking place, were defined in cultural terms, via the inter-cultural dialogue which mainly reinforced the reproduction of existing stereotypes (Behr, 2013; Burgat, 2009; Silvestri, 2005; Wolff, 2015). In contrast, the regimes in power, despite their illiberal stance and autocratic nature, were perceived as less threatening to the EU’s identity given their secular traits and their support for the EU’s neoliberal agenda (see articles by Kourtelis and Roccu). They were thus in the position to strengthening the EU’s essentialist frame, presenting Islamists as anti-systemic forces with the potential of disrupting order, if they had come to power (Aliboni & Ammor, 2009). 
Following 9/11, some signs of change in the EU’s essentialist frame appeared, as the EU started to distinguish, at least on paper, between ‘radical’ actors (often linked to terrorism) representing an existential threat to the West, and ‘moderate’ Islamists with whom to potentially enter into dialogue (European Commission, 2007: 7; Behr, 2013). The latter were those  ‘Muslim organisations and faith groups that reject the distorted version of Islam put forward by Al Qaida and others’​[3]​ as well as ‘those political organisations which promote democracy by non-violent means, excluding sectarian, fundamentalist and extremist nationalist forces but including, where appropriate, secular actors and moderate Islamists’​[4]​. Suggestions that the EU and its member states should engage with non-violent and non-revolutionary Islamist actors were also made by the Task Force on Political Islamism, a group created in 2006 with the aim of offering training programmes on and build up significant information about Islamism worldwide (Kausch, 2009). 
While this seemed to be an initial, although still quite generic, appreciation that not all forms of political Islam can be subsumed under the same umbrella, engagement did not amount to any type of official, and even less so, coherent and systematic approach by the EU as a whole, with only few informal contacts with some Islamist actors either via EU delegations or with those in exile in Europe (cf. Kausch, 2009).​[5]​ The only exception to this policy of no-engagement was that of the Turkish AKP, which has embodied State Islamism in Turkey in the form of a socially-conservative, centre-right and adaptable political party, able to brand itself as the product of the process of domestic liberalisation of political Islam in the country (Yıldız 2009; Zeyno 2010). Given the AKP’s ability to foster the perception of a successful synthesis of Islam and secular, liberal democracy, the EU overcame its initial fear of the party being a challenge to EU universalist norms and the division between religion and politics. The EU thus viewed the AKP’s coming to power as a step forward in the country’s normalization process (Hale and Őzbudun 2010) and identified in the party its main interlocutor (Hurd 2008; Jenkins 2008). This precedent of EU engagement with political Islam has been indicated, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, as the path to be followed both by the EU itself and by the Islamist-dominated governments in the region (e.g. Jacoby 2010; Keyman and Gumuscu 2014). However the EU-AKP relations seem to be better understood as the rather contingent evolution dictated by the specific circumstances stemming from the bilateral EU-Turkey relations and the set of constraints and opportunities of the Turkish bid for EU access (cf. Kirisci 2008; Engert 2010; Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci 2015), more than a reassessment of the EU’s stance towards political Islam as a whole.
 A more significant revision to the essentialist framing of political Islam came in the wake of the Arab uprisings, which represented a crucial blow for the EU’s cognitive stability concerning its Southern neighbourhood. After years of exclusion, repression and at times co-optation from the incumbent regimes, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings some Islamist parties like Ennahda in Tunisia and the newly-constituted Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won electoral competitions, and a variety of Islamist actors, including ultra-conservatives, former jihadists, independent Islamists, Sufis, started to occupy the space left by secular and leftist forces (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). These dynamics underlined the extent to which the Islamist scene in the Arab world was far from monolithic and how the EU’s approach of no-engagement was untenable. 
Although the underlying assumption about political Islam as the ‘Other’ and as a potential threat to the EU’s ontological security was not abandoned, the EU started to adopt a more nuanced and contingencist understanding of the multifaceted nature of political Islam. By considering that Islamists’ behaviour and stances depend on the context in which they are embedded, the EU started to become more sensitive to differences among different groups and to see more room for compatibility between some Islamist parties and its own identity, values and perceived interests. Analytically, this revised frame is best characterised by a threefold differentiation into moderate, conservative, and violent political Islam. 
In the first category (moderate) fall all those Islamist parties that, as much as in the Turkish AKP case during the 2000s, do not openly challenge the EU’s ontological security.​[6]​ Moderation is thus equated with the renunciation of violence and the acceptance of some ground rules that the EU considers as key, including the adherence to democratic principles, the acceptance of liberal conceptions in both political and the economic domains in their exercise of power, and the tempering of their religious discourse (cf. Kausch, 2009).​[7]​ On several instances, the EU has indeed reaffirmed its support for all those actors that abide by democratic principles and show respect of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination.​[8]​ In addition, moderate Islamist actors are those that ‘work with [the EU] and contribute to serving [the EU’s] perceived interests’).​[9]​ 
On the opposite extreme, there are the violent Islamists, some of which are perceived to be linked to terrorism. Among others, Hamas and the military wing of Hezbollah fall into this category. Despite the formal presence of both parties on the Palestinian and Lebanese scenes respectively and their coming to power via elections, they are not perceived as moderate due to their use of violence and a confrontational stance towards the West. In the case of Hamas, for example, engagement was conditioned on the movement’s recognition of Israel, its renunciation of violence and the respect of previously signed agreements between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Israel. Consistently with the EU’s red line, these Islamist actors are ostracised by the EU and not engaged in any form of dialogue or interaction. The no-engagement is reciprocal as these actors tend to use a rhetoric of confrontation with the West, Europe and the non-Muslim world in general (Pace 2010). The by-product of the action of these violent actors is the reinforcement of the idea of a clash of identities between Europe and Islam, accentuating the process of identity construction via opposition. Importantly, the EU seems now to be very careful in stressing the distinction between moderate and violent Islamist actors, especially to counteract the essentialist readings of Islam that some extreme right-wing parties are fomenting within Europe. In this regard, the High Representative Federica Mogherini repeatedly stated that ‘[t]errorism must not be an excuse for discrimination against European Muslim. […] Political Islam is a very broad classification: it can include democratic parties as well as radical movements’.​[10]​
Between these two categories, there are the conservative Islamist actors, who adopt a stricter interpretation of Islam compared to the moderate and aim to give religion a more important and visible place in the political life of their country, including in the legislation via the promotion of Sharia. Because of their stances on a number of issues, such as curtailed women and minorities’ rights, they are perceived as posing a threat to the liberal pillars of the EU’s identity and model and, while not being openly antagonised, they are left on the margins and not significantly engaged with by the EU in its policies and programmes, as relations between the EU and Salafist movements and parties show (Cavatorta 2015). For example, the former High Representative Ashton distinguished between ‘some Salafists and the more “mainstream Islamists”’, arguing that ‘radical Salafists constitute a very small minority in Tunisia and even in Egypt they are outnumbered by the more moderate Islamists’.​[11]​ The fact that these actors are not in power, or in certain cases outright refuse to participate in representative politics, also gives a larger margin of manoeuvre to the EU, which does not need to engage with them as political representatives of their country. 
Not only is this partially revised frame of political Islam the result of a process of reframing that the EU underwent following the Arab uprisings. It is also the result of interactions with the same Islamist actors, which are now more visible and present on the political scene of Southern Mediterranean countries. In the wake of 2011, Islamist parties have been in the position to shape the way in which the EU has defined its understanding of them via their own rhetoric, actions and their (un)willingness to engage with western actors. This relational dimension is key to understand the way in which the EU has framed the potential threat of political Islam to its own identity and has opted for a policy of engagement or not. The differentiation into moderate, conservative and violent Islamist parties makes it possible to perceive some actors as less threatening than others to the EU’s identity and hence more likely to be engaged with. At the same time, these categories are fluid, insofar as the categorisation of Islamist actors is contingent and subject to change, also in turn shaping the ways in which engagement takes place. 

The EU and Islamist political actors: from no-engagement to selective engagement
An essentialist reading of political Islam thus proved untenable after 2011, forcing the EU to partially revise its framing of the security-stability nexus in relation to Islamist actors. As highlighted in the previous section, the more contingencist reading that emerged opened up the possibility of forms of selective engagement with Islamist political parties, especially in those countries in which they have played an important and visible role in the process of transition such as Tunisia and Egypt. Yet, the EU’s engagement remains selective, mainly confined to those actors viewed as moderate. The EU’s perception of ‘moderation’ was also influenced by domestic developments and events on the ground, namely the Islamists’ status and behaviour during the political transition, which largely differed in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. The crucial difference concerns the extent to which the Islamists in power, namely Ennahda and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), were able to forge an inclusive system and provide space for other actors’ political demands, as well as abide by liberal and democratic principles  in terms of separation of powers, respect of the rule of law, etc. At the same time, and even more pronounced, there is a clear within-country articulation in terms of the EU’s engagement with other Islamist parties in the two countries, which reflects the threefold categorisation into moderate, conservative and violent actors. 
By showing with whom and how the EU engages with political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt, this section explains how the EU’s revised frame is enacted in practice, highlighting patterns of inclusion-exclusion among Islamist parties and the reliance on both material incentives and discursive tools when engagement takes place. 

Tunisia: ‘the good, the ugly, the bad’
Following 2011 the EU’s considered political reforms and governance as main goals, whose accomplishment had to start with the implementation of sound electoral processes through fair procedures and competition. In the case of Tunisia, this issue has intertwined with the coming to power of Ennahda, which epitomises the moderate Islamist party in the EU’s view and whose appeal stemmed from its own internal trajectory from a fundamentalist to a conservative party and then to a moderate, centre-right political force (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). After three decades of repression, forced exile and marginalisation, the party was able to enter the political scene by winning 89 seats out of 217 of the Constituent Assembly in the elections of 23 October 2011. Ennahda abandoned its anti-democratic and illiberal vision of politics and renounced the use of violence due to its inclusion into the political system next to other forces. This also meant adopting a pragmatic – to some other observers rather an opportunist – behaviour with a view to appealing to the greatest number of voters, gaining electoral legitimacy and increasing its power (Schwedler, 2011). 
With these credentials, Ennahda was readily welcomed by the EU as the necessary and viable political interlocutor and partner for engagement.​[12]​ This trend responded both to the EU’s appreciation of the party’s transition mentioned above and – connected to that – to its pragmatic attitude in wanting to open channels for dialogue and cooperation with its partners. In engaging with Ennahda, the EU was keen on emphasising its previous experience with the Turkish AKP and the Turkish model, until recently hailed, domestically and externally alike, as an archetype for successfully blending Islamic liberalism with free market capitalism. According to the EU, this was something that could directly appeal to other Muslim-majority countries in the Southern Mediterranean as a means to foster stability and security, and specifically to Tunisia in view of the country’s entrenched relations with the West (Tuğal 2016).​[13]​
The image of Ennahda as the good partner in the EU’s eyes was further reinforced by the prolonged period of constitution-making between October 2011 and February 2014. On multiple occasions, the party showed its ability to negotiate and compromise in the context of the coalition government, as for example, evident in the debate on the form of the new Tunisian government. Another sign of Ennahda’s tendency to share power and prioritise inclusion had to do with the respect of civil rights and liberties of all individuals and a more balanced representation of women in political bodies. Ennahda agreed to drop an initial reference to the “complementary role” of women to men that appeared in one of the earlier drafts of the constitutional text and maintain the 1956 personal status code giving women equality with men has remained in force (Ottaway 2013). 
During the constitution-making phase and in response to Ennahda’s stance, the EU reached out to the new Tunisian authorities as a sign of its willingness to engage with the moderate Islamist party in power on the basis of common values. On the occasion of the Tunisian Islamist Prime Minister Jebali’s visit to the European Commission in February 2012, the two parties made a joint declaration, stating that:
 
The visit has allowed to start a high-level political dialogue between the new Tunisian authorities and EU authorities with the aim of starting a new stage in the bilateral relations which will allow, on the basis of shared values, to envisage a more sustained support to Tunisia by the EU and a progressive integration in the common European market (emphasis added).​[14]​ 

Moreover, the EU was particularly forthcoming in terms of material incentives towards democratising Tunisia on the basis of the principle of conditionality. Up to June 2016, Tunisia had received more than €1bn in grants, of which €445m in development assistance under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) when the Islamists were in power (2011-13). The majority of funding was allocated to support the economy and the transition to democracy (van Hüllen, 2015). It also comprised significant funding (€155m) under the SPRING − Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth – Programme, which provides assistance on a ‘more for more’ basis for partner countries showing sustained commitment to and progress in democratic reforms. This financial and material assistance wasalso matched by the establishment of a privileged partnership, which reflects the EU’s commitment to supporting the country’s transition. This was also reiterated at the highest political level, such as during the special attendance of the independent head of the Tunisian government, Habib Essid, at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 20 July 2015, chaired by the High Representative Federica Mogherini.​[15]​ On that occasion, the EU’s spelled out its political will: 

to support Tunisia in its democratic transition […] at a difficult time in terms of security challenges and the fight against terrorism, in which we are all united.​[16]​

This pragmatic cooperation has continued following the October 2014 parliamentary elections that resulted in a coalition between Ennahda and the secular party Nidaa Tounes. Although some EU’s member states may prefer to work with the secular side of the Tunisian government, the EU’s engagement with Ennahda has not been abandoned.​[17]​ Ennahda remains a very important political partner for the EU in the struggle against instability and radicalisation as the party continues to espouse a moderate centre-right outlook on political and economic issues, while marking its distance from the more radical Salafist groups and their often ambiguous stance towards radicalisation and terrorism.​[18]​ This engagement is clear in the EU’s increased material and discursive engagement with Tunisia, especially after the terrorist attacks in Bardo and Sousse in 2015.​[19]​ Because terrorism, insecurity and the lack of socio-economic reforms and governance – with the risk of radicalisation among some sectors of the population and of the second generation of European citizens coming from North Africa – are growing EU concerns, the EU has strengthened its support in the realms of economic recovery, reform of the legal sector, gender equality, security sector reform and border management. Moreover, it reiterated ‘its determination to support the efforts of the government and civil society to consolidate the country’s democratic achievements and the rule of law’ on the occasion of the 2016 EU-Tunisia Association Council.​[20]​


In the wake of the 2011 uprisings, Ennahda was not the only Islamist party to emerge on the political stage. Tunisia also experienced a surge in Salafist mobilisation, whereby Tunisian Salafists – best understood as a diverse collection of religiously conservative groups who position themselves to the right of Ennahda – have come to occupy an increasingly visible and active role in society and/or in politics (Marks, 2013). Although the term ‘Salafist’ is usually treated as a synonym to ‘being conservative’, Tunisian Salafism is characterised by different sets of political behaviour that can be distinguished between quietist, political (which can be described as ‘the ugly’, the conservative Islamists in the EU’s eyes) and jihadist (‘the bad’, the violent Islamists). Quietist Salifists are conservative Islamists simply preaching a return to the origins of Islam (the age of the Salaf) and not engaging in politics. Although they are somehow dissatisfied with Ennahda’s failure to secure some key demands of the most religious strata in the country, including the reference to Sharia as the main or sole source of legislation in the constitution, they keep themselves away from the political fray. Political Salafists, on the contrary, while moving from the same conservative ideological position, have opted to participate actively in the political and institutional processes of their country. A good example of this group is Jabhat al-Islah (‘Front of Reform’), the first official Salafist party in Tunisia, which since 2012 has worked towards the objective of creating an Islamic state that applies Sharia in all spheres of life.​[21]​ This is clearly in opposition to liberal principles and values. This is the reason why some analysts speak of a the failure of the process of institutionalisation and moderation that worked for Ennahda (Cavatorta, 2015), thus considering Jabhat al-Islah an “anti-system party” (Torelli et al, 2012: 147). Socially, the party has called for the re-introduction of polygamy abolished by the 1956 personal status code. Western attitudes, including the EU’s one, towards the Front have tended to be tepid if not outright negative. The party is perceived to pose a danger to liberal democracy and stability if it gained greater support among the population. As a result, the EU has refrained to engage with it openly. According to some sources, engagement with political Salafists – and Jabhat al-Islah in particular – does take place but is mostly confined at the level of some European national governments, for example Switzerland, with which the EU institutions exchange notes, trying to capitalise on their outreach.​[22]​
One of the obstacles faced by political Salafism in Tunisia to establish itself as a point of reference in the political system, beyond its being resource-strapped and structurally disorganised, lies in the generational gap that exists in society (Marks 2013). Disenfranchised Tunisian youth who are attracted by Salafist ideology vehemently reject the institutionalisation of party politics and tend to be directed towards jihadist Salafism. The main recipient of these people has been Ansar al-Sharia, the jihadist organisation set up in April 2011 that regroups under its label different local organisations operating across the country. In spite of being a truly local jihadist movement, Ansar al-Sharia maintains links with global jihadism when it comes to its objectives and tactics​[23]​. As such, it falls in the category of violent Islamists and is totally ostracised by the EU and its member states. No engagement whatsoever takes place, even at the indirect level, between the EU and Ansar al-Sharia, which was declared a terrorist organisation by the Tunisian government in August 2013.

Egypt: the parabola of the Muslim Brotherhood party and the EU’s engagement
The Egyptian context was also very fluid after the ousting of Mubarak, which made it possible for the emergence and affirmation of new political parties on the political stage. Among these, the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP established its presence in both the parliamentary elections of 2011 and the presidential ones in 2012 won by Mohamed Morsi. The trajectory of EU-Muslim Brotherhood relations is very different from the Tunisian case: the FJP was initially engaged with due to the perception of its being a moderate actor, but the intensity of the engagement started to wane over time and ended up in a return to almost non-engagement when Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi took power in mid-2013 and the party was formally dissolved in 2014. 
The transfer of power from the Mubarak-controlled National Democratic Party (NDP) to the Islamist parties was not a smooth one .This process was followed closely by the EU, with election results welcomed with a certain dose of scepticism. The FJP and its coalition won 37.5 per cent of the parliamentary vote between November 2011 and January 2012, while the coalition headed by the Salafist party Al-Nour came second with 27.8 per cent of the popular vote. Following the initial scepticism, the EU reacted pragmatically and readily demonstrated its support and commitment to the Egyptian transition and to reach out to the elected authorities while calling on them: 

to govern according to the principles of ‘consensus-building and inclusion,’ echoing the general climate of scepticism surrounding the hegemony of Islamist parties in all elected institutions, and yet congratulated the Egyptian authorities on their attempts to develop a working electoral democracy (Pinfari, 2013: 463). 

Overall, the need to take stock quickly of the rapidly evolving situation on the ground made the EU continue on, and even reinforce, its pragmatic track in light of the relative change in the frame applied to political Islam. The first meeting between Catherine Ashton and Mohamed Morsi on 19 July 2012 was the occasion to make this selective, pragmatic engagement clear.​[24]​ Good relations seemed to be on track, with willingness to engage on both sides. During Morsi’s visit to Brussels in September 2012, the High Representative announced the launch of a previously-negotiated EU-Egypt Task Force in November of that year, with the aim of supporting the Egyptian transition and the country’s weak economic situation.​[25]​ In the November high-profile meeting, new financial commitments were made by the EU, which agreed to provide nearly €5bn in grants and loans for 2012-2013 and an additional support of nearly €800m to be added to the money already earmarked for 2011-2013. The Task Force also agreed to explore ways to deepen trade and investment relations as well as means to intensify technical cooperation.​[26]​
However, relations were not always smooth. On the revision of the constitution, the FJP did not show Ennahda’s flexibility and willingness to compromise, out of fear that this could jeopardise its own internal cohesion. The party was dominated by the most intransigent fringe of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that “had been built not for open democratic competition but for resilience under authoritarian pressure. It was tight-knit, inward-looking, and even paranoid” (Brown, 2013: 57). The feeling of being under threat by the encroaching of other political forces from the secular camp led to what was derogatorily described as an attempt to ‘Ikhwanise’ the state, i.e., to promote and entrench, through institutional as well as social actions the type of Islam espoused and developed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan). Although it should be questioned whether this accusation effectively described the reality, it clearly reflected a widespread feeling, particularly among the ranks of the judiciary, which had already been severely tested under the Mubarak regime (Rutherford 2008). Under the Islamist presidency of Morsi, the judiciary was targeted by a new round of decisions that severely damaged its at least formal autonomy. The conflict between the judiciary and the Muslim Brotherhood was viewed with growing anxiety as it unfolded in 2012-2013, ultimately leading to the mounting of opposition against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood establishment.
The latter’s inability to compromise directly clashed with the EU’s emphasis on inclusiveness in Egypt’s constitutional revision process. For example, MEP Marietje Schaake called for the suspension of all EU aid until Morsi would go back and restore judiciary oversight as before.​[27]​ Further tensions between the EU and Egypt emerged in a Resolution by the European Parliament in March 2013 in which MEPs called 

on the EU not to grant any budgetary support to the Egyptian authorities if no major progress is made regarding respect for human rights and freedoms, democratic governance and the rule of law.​[28]​

It also reinforced the already widespread perception among many EU officials that the main risk of having the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Egypt stemmed from their ability to run day-to-day politics while at the same time retaining their identity as a broader social movement. It became soon evident that the risk derived less from the Muslim Brotherhood directly challenging or threatening western values and interests than from its stirring tensions with other political and social forces, which could eventually spill over into general instability. This element of risk turned into reality with the ouster of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013.
Since then, Egypt has undergone a phase of heightened conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military-led regime under Al-Sisi. In response to these domestic developments, EU diplomacy made an effort to keep up with the active engagement with all the groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as an attempt to put an end to the violence. With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, Catherine Ashton raised her voice against the use of force against its members and the attempt to isolate them. In her opinion, “the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood will at best bring short-term stability while damaging further the prospects of building democracy” (Dempsey, 2013). In her mediation attempts, the EU’s foreign policy chief was the first foreign diplomat to visit Egypt and hold talks with the ousted president at his custodial place at the end of July 2013. 
However, much of this engagement started to fade in 2014 and 2015 as once again the Egyptian state and society were reined in under the iron fist of Al-Sisi protected by the military establishment and the security apparatuses and, at the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood’s grip on Egyptian politics was significantly jeopardised and obliterated by the violent repression suffered by the movement. The new regime’s rhetoric, fanned by the military’s regional backers, i.e., Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, contributed to tarnishing the image of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the EU started to distance itself from the once moderate Islamists and to accuse them of stirring tensions with the Christian minority, when it was clear that it was the Ministry of the Interior orchestrating attacks on the Copts to discredit the Muslim Brotherhood (Youngs, 2014: 135). The image of the Muslim Brotherhood in the EU’s eyes started to change, going from that of a moderate Islamist political actor and hence a potential partner in view of its role in the Egyptian political system to that – following the rhetoric of the new military regime – of a dangerous anti-system movement to be marginalised. In this context, low-profile engagement has been going on with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood outside official channels and often outside the country, reaching out to the movement’s affiliates and sympathisers abroad, mainly in London or Istanbul, who play the role of the opposition in (auto) exile.​[29]​ 
In the context of the fluid Egyptian political landscape, the place occupied by the myriad of Salafist groups and parties (Al-Nour, Al-Asala, Al-Bina’ wa-l-Tanmiya) that have chosen to take an active part in politics has been relatively minor and has not given rise to any significant forms of engagement with the EU. This is not meant to deny the fact that the political breakthrough of Salafism in Egypt during 2011-2012 has played an important role in altering its image as an apolitical form of Islamic activism. However, the results of this process were mixed in terms of the Salafists’ ability to reconcile party politics and their grassroots (Høigilt & Nome, 2014). Even more so than in the Muslim Brotherhood case, then, these conservative forces have been regarded with suspicion and even a certain degree of fear by the EU. Few opportunities for engagement have opened up for formalising contacts with the Egyptian Salafist parties due to their radical ideological positions. Material factors, i.e. financial inducements, also did play a role in that these parties did not actively seek the EU’s cooperation rather opting for a privileged relationship with their main funders and supporters from the Arabian Gulf peninsula (Youngs 2014: 134).​[30]​ However, some marginal outreach by some EU member states was made in the attempt to indirectly promote a more robust dialogue and common ground rules between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in the name of inclusiveness.​[31]​ The results of this engagement were however meagre in light of the simmering competition and enmity between the moderate and the conservative Islamists, being played one against the other by the secular elites. 

The EU and Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings between ontological security and selective engagement
This article has offered an analysis of EU-Islamist relations in the Southern Mediterranean by dwelling on the case studies of Tunisia and Egypt. It has shown that the EU moved from outright lack of engagement with Islamist parties prior to 2011 to forms of selective engagement in the wake of the Arab uprisings. While many forms of political Islam are still kept at the margins, the EU has started to progressively engage with those Islamist political parties that are considered as moderate, i.e., they are not perceived as posing an existential threat to the EU’s identity and values, have gained power through fair and free elections, and have renounced violence.
In line with the overall thrust of this special issue, this article has explained this partial change in the EU’s approach to political Islam by focusing on frames and their enactment. While the perception of political Islam as a threat to its ontological security, persists, this frame has been nuanced over time and, more significantly, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. Contrary to the EU’s past framing of Islamists as part of an undifferentiated phenomenon, against which the EU had to defend itself, after the Arab uprisings, the EU realised that its previous approach was untenable. It thus accepted that the Islamists are different and that their trajectories are directly shaped by the context in which they are embedded. In light of this, the EU has started to differentiate between moderate, conservative and violent actors. As a result of this revised frame, the previous lack of engagement with Islamist actors - a process also facilitated by the authoritarian regimes in power, who were able to reinforce the perception of threat as well as to keep them outside of the official political arena - has been substituted by forms of selective engagement. Hence, the EU is ready to engage with moderate Islamist parties – perceived as not being a threat to its identity - by deploying an array of material incentives and discursive tools, while it continues to ostracise the conservative strands and to fight violent Islamists, still viewed as incompatible and threatening to its ontological security. This partial change in the frame has also had repercussions on the meaning and practice of pragmatism, which is clearly contingent on changing circumstances and the EU’s perceptions of them, characterising the EU’s stance towards the region. 
By investigating EU-Islamist relations in the Southern Mediterranean after the Arab uprisings, this article thus contributes to acquiring a more fine-grained understanding of change and continuity in EU policies towards the region. While the EU has generally been accused of implementing the same type of policies despite their failure and the changed realities on the ground, this article has shown that a partial shift has taken place in EU policies towards Islamist political actors. Driven by a partially modified framing of political Islam, the enactment of EU policies is now characterised by forms of selective engagement, thus leading to patterns of inclusion and exclusion with the Islamists across and within countries. Although this does not amount to a U-turn in the EU’s overall approach, it further reinforces the view that policy enactment is shaped by the ways in which the EU interprets the reality and establishes cause-effects links. 
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